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ABSTRACT 
Waterboarding, rendition, torture: each of these terms 
provides deeply negative examples of the mishandling of 
detainees by various entities of the United States 
government during the prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In order to rectify these failures of the various 
systems within the U.S. military’s detention framework, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) developed and issued Field 
Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This 
new doctrine has created restrictions that add unnecessary 
hours to the process of exploiting detainees through 
tactical interrogation. Due to the autonomous nature of 
their missions, the significance for U.S. Army Special 
Forces is immense.  
Tactical interrogation is a legal, viable, and 
necessary method of information gathering on the 
battlefield. FM 2-22.3 has taken away USSF’s capability to 
exploit an immense pool of intelligence that could be 
critical in the current conflicts. This thesis explores the 
limitations imposed by current doctrine and discusses 
changes necessary to provide the skills, training, and legal 
authorities that will allow Special Forces to use every 
appropriate resource to be successful on the modern 
battlefield. Recommendations are provided regarding training 
and doctrine to provide the proper authorities along with 
appropriate checks and balances. 
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Waterboarding, rendition, torture: these terms are 
synonymous with debates over the mishandling of detainees by 
various entities of the United States government during the 
prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to 
improve the failures and weaknesses of processing and 
handling detainees within the U.S. military’s detention 
system, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed and issued 
Field Manual 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 
In January 2009, the new field manual became more than 
military doctrine. It became the law of the land through the 
signing of Executive Order 13491-Ensuring Lawful 
Interrogations which highlighted the new field manual as the 
single point of reference for any U.S. government agency 
conducting interrogation. This new doctrine is an over-
correction that obstructs units at the tactical level from 
acquiring the intelligence needed for success in the current 
irregular conflict.   
Tactical interrogation is a legal, viable, and 
necessary method of information gathering on the 
battlefield. The new manual specifically restricts the 
authority to interrogate enemy detainees to a very small 
number of U.S. personnel. Because of their small number, 
these personnel are posted only at major bases, often over 
100 miles—six hours by road—from the point of capture. The 
requirement to move detainees to these specific personnel 
for exploitation takes valuable time that allows the 
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detainee to recover from the shock of capture, resulting in 
a heightened state of awareness and an increased resistance 
to questioning. Timeliness is critical to the information 
the detainee possesses. Information decreases in value the 
older it becomes, and FM 2.22-3 has created restrictions 
that add unnecessary hours to the process of gathering and 
exploiting detainees through interrogation.   
The significance of this for U.S. Army Special Forces 
(USSF) is immense. Special Forces soldiers are on the front 
lines of numerous conflicts around the globe, gathering 
human intelligence (HUMINT).  By virtue of their training in 
the language, the ethnography, and the history of various 
regions, USSF personnel possess a better understanding of 
the operational environment than any other element of the 
DoD.  Consequently, there is pressure for USSF personnel to 
provide timely intelligence gained firsthand on the 
battlefield. USSF work in small, autonomous units with the 
requirement to be operationally self-sufficient in all areas 
to include all available resources of HUMINT collection 
capability. Inadvertently, FM 2-22.3 has taken away USSF’s 
authority to gather and exploit a vast pool of information 
and intelligence that could be critical in the conduct of 
the current struggle against terrorism and fundamentalism. 
The U.S. government needs detailed information about 
its adversaries, as well as a strategic and ethnographic 
understanding of how the information fits together.1  HUMINT 
is particularly critical in irregular warfare, but U.S. 
                     
1 Robert Coulam, “Approaches to Interrogation in the Struggle against 
Terrorism: Considerations of Cost and Benefit,” in Educing Information—
Interrogation: Science and Art, ed. Robert Fein (Washington, DC: 
National Defense Intelligence College, 2006), 8. 
 3
HUMINT networks are often weakest precisely in the regions 
where terrorist and insurgent organizations that threaten 
U.S. national interests tend to thrive. The effective use of 
appropriate interrogation methods by USSF in these regions 
could provide a substantial increase in the amount of 
reliable intelligence available at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of conflict. USSF is 
focused on working by, with, and through indigenous 
populations and is regionally aligned around geographical 
and cultural areas of focus. These factors put USSF in a 
critical position to gather critical information. Their 
inherent understanding of different populations provides 
vital information important to commanders and decision 
makers at all levels of conflict. Unfortunately, the new 
doctrine presented in FM 2-22.3 denies USSF the capability 
of gaining needed intelligence requirements through the use 
of interrogation. 
Some will argue that the current FM 2-22.3 doctrine has 
improved interrogation operations within Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, the maturity of these theaters lies in 
stark contrast to the potentially austere and rapidly 
changing environments that USSF will face during future 
operations. These ambiguous environments are the specific 
reason that USSF must be provided a clear, concise policy 
granting the authority to conduct interrogation operations 
around the globe. The vast uncertainty of irregular 
operational environments alone highlights the need for this 
clarity of policy. The U.S. government cannot afford to 
simply hope USSF soldiers will correctly interpret the 
obscure laws and shifting intents regarding interrogation 
during the conduct of combat operations across the globe. 
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Failure to grant these authorities and provide the necessary 
doctrine and training contradicts the expectation for 
increased actionable intelligence. This not only wastes the 
abilities of USSF operators, it is invites potential 
detainee abuses. 
1. A History of Interrogation in Warfare 
Interrogating prisoners for intelligence is as old as 
the practice of warfare itself. Example after example lie 
within the books of martial history where intelligence 
gained through interrogation shifted the outcome of battles, 
campaigns, and wars. Information gathered from the 
interrogations of captured Hittite spies saved Pharaoh 
Ramesses II’s ancient Egyptian army at Kadesh in 1274 BC.2  
The Romans were able to erase the threat of a Carthaginian 
conquest of Rome at the battle of the Metaurus River when 
Gaius Claudius Nero learned of Hasdrubal’s plan to join 
forces with his brother Hannibal through the interrogation 
of captured Carthaginian couriers during the Second Punic 
War.3   
The importance of intelligence gained from 
interrogations has been highlighted by military strategists 
throughout history. Sun Tzu stresses that: “What is called 
‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from  
 
 
                     
2 Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near 
East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the 
Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (Camden,NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1974), 12-14. 
3 David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World 
War II (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 27. 
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gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from 
calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the 
enemy situation.”4 
Swiss General Henri Jomini describes the interrogation, 
along with a system of espionage and reconnaissance, as one 
of the most reliable sources of intelligence available to 
commanders. 5  He goes on to stress that interrogation of 
prisoners can yield positive results only when conducted by 
intelligent personnel “who can so frame their questions as 
to elicit important information.”6  Generals Sheridan, 
McClellan, and Meade shared this view as evidenced through 
their personal involvement in the systematic and thorough 
examination of captured prisoners during the American Civil 
War.7 
After 4,000 years of warfare, the wars of the twentieth 
century brought about a paradigm shift that would forever 
alter the importance of intelligence and the role of 
interrogation. By dividing intelligence into two categories, 
David Kahn illustrates that physical intelligence is derived 
from things (i.e., bodies of troops, the sound of artillery) 
and verbal intelligence is derived from words (i.e., a 
report on enemy morale, an intercepted order). Understanding 
the differences and the interconnectedness of the two 
provides for intelligence supremacy. Prior to World War I, 
physical intelligence provided the preponderance of 
                     
4 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: University Press, 1963), 145. 
5 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classic Strategic Thought (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 249. 
6 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 270. 
7 Steven M. Kleinman, “The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of 
Torture,” Valparaiso University Law Review 43 (2009): 1580. 
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intelligence for leaders in conflict. During the “Great 
War,” conditions shifted to foster collection of verbal 
intelligence—specifically prisoner interrogations. Verbal 
intelligence was now more important than physical because it 
gave commanders time –time to prepare, time to react, time 
to plan.8 
The increasing value placed on verbal intelligence by 
the end of World War I vaulted interrogation to a new level. 
This resulted in the development of successful American, 
British, and German interrogation programs during World War 
II that demonstrated the potential treasure trove of 
information that can be obtained from the systematic, 
outcome-oriented approach to interrogation that relied far 
more on finesse than on force.9  After the war, the world 
became focused on nuclear conflict and the Cold War shifting 
intelligence priorities again to the physical—monitoring 
massed forces and counting ICBM sites through satellites and 
signal technology. The potential for interrogation as a 
source of intelligence became “lost in the shadows” of the 
various new disciplines of TECHINT.10  Unfortunately, the 
failures of the sophisticated technologies in weapons and 
intelligence to appropriately counter the enemy in irregular 
conflicts, such as Vietnam and Somalia, were ignored by a 
system designed to fight conventional wars between nations. 
As the United States entered the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the reports of abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, 
                     
8 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 40. 
9 Kleinman, “The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of Torture,” 
1587. 
10 Kleinman, “The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of 
Torture,” 1578. 
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and various “rendition” sites served as the impetus for a 
long-overdue examination of the role of interrogation as a 
necessary and critical instrument in the current irregular 
fight and the importance of meshing HUMINT with TECHINT.11  
2. Current Doctrinal Inadequacies 
Previous to the release of FM 2-22.3 in September 2006, 
the U.S. Army operated under FM 34-52 Intelligence 
Interrogation (original release May 1987, revised September 
1992).  Arguably a reasonable reference for interrogation of 
a conventional enemy on a conventional battlefield, FM 34-52 
was based on methods designed around experiences from World 
War II and the Cold War. It targeted the interrogation of 
large groups of young enemy soldiers with limited 
information and life experience by U.S. soldiers who were 
likewise young, with limited experience. Interrogations 
would occur at various levels starting at the brigade level 
and ending in a theater-level POW camp. While FM 34-52 is 
criticized for being “too Cold War” in application, one of 
its primary strengths was that it provided a basic framework 
for battlefield interrogation by any soldier. It did not 
limit the authority of most soldiers at the tactical level 
of the battlefield to conduct interrogation.12  The 
following excerpt from FM 2-22.3 demonstrates that the new 
doctrine has removed this authority: 
Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel 
trained and certified in the interrogation  
 
                     
11 Kleinman, “Interrogation v. Torture,” 1578. 
12 James A. Stone, David P. Shoemaker, and Nicholas R. Dotti, 
Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq (Washington DC: National 
Defense Intelligence College, 2008), 166. 
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methodology, including personnel in MOSs 97E, 
351M (351E), or select others as may be approved 
by DOD policy.13 
The basis for this doctrine grew from the 
investigations that were conducted in the wake of the 
prisoner abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison in late 
2003.  These investigations found the conditions that 
allowed for the abuse of the detainees were created by a 
lack of clear policy that was amplified by outdated doctrine 
and continually changing memorandums. The doctrine guiding 
interrogators and soldiers did not address many of the most 
difficult situations soldiers were repeatedly faced with on 
the ground.14   
The Independent Panel on DoD Detention Operations, 
chaired by former Secretary of Defense and Director of 
Central Intelligence James Schlesinger, conducted and 
produced the most thorough report to date on detention and 
interrogation operations taking place in Iraq (Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, OIF) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring 
Freedom, OEF).  Released in August 2004, the panel states in 
its findings, “The current doctrine and procedures for 
detaining personnel are inadequate to meet the requirements 
of these [OIF/OEF] conflicts” based on the “vastly different 
circumstances in these conflicts.”15  The DoD addressed this 
issue in April 2005 with the announcement that a new 
interrogation manual would be produced to replace FM 34-52.   
                     
13 FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, paragraph 1-20, 
1-8. 
14 Stone, et al., Interrogation, 164. 
15 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 53. 
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 Unfortunately, during the 18 months it took the 
pentagon to produce FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations, the vast majority of the findings from the 
investigations of 2004 that dealt with operations at the 
tactical level were not implemented. Recommendations for 
“more specialists for detention/interrogation operations” to 
include linguists, interrogators, and human intelligence, 
along with the need to “place special and early emphasis on 
detention operations during Counter-Insurgency campaigns and 
Stability Operations in which familiar concepts of front and 
rear areas may not apply,” were simply not included within 
the new doctrine.16  Rather than outlining or detailing 
doctrine that could be used by tactical units to adapt 
standard operating procedures regarding the detaining of 
individuals for intelligence during irregular warfare, the 
new manual was overly specific and inflexible dictating that 
a very small number of specially trained and certified 
individuals were the only personnel authorized to conduct 
interrogation operations.17  While the interrogation schools 
operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps continue to 
produce interrogators who are highly skilled in the 
fundamentals of tactical interrogations to effectively 
gather intelligence and information, the schools just cannot 
produce enough graduates to fill the need for interrogation 
skills at the lowest tactical levels. This strict definition 
took away the capability of almost every tactical level 
soldier to gain intelligence and information including USSF 
beyond the limited capacity of immediate tactical 
                     
16 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 90. 
17 FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, paragraph 1-20, 
1-8. 
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questioning. None of the investigations cited tactical level 
units detaining individuals as being the root of abuse or 
mistreatment.18  Yet even with data demonstrating a similar 
level of abuse between units trained and untrained in 
detention and interrogation operations, the new doctrine 
excludes all untrained soldiers from conducting these 
operations. Additionally, the recommendation of implementing 
“a professional ethics program that would equip soldiers 
with a sharp moral compass for guidance in situations often 
riven with conflicting moral obligations” for “all personnel 
who may be engaged in detention operations, from point of 
capture to final disposition.”19  Four years later, there is 
still no doctrine that addresses training USSF (or 
infantrymen) for detention and/or interrogation operations. 
While the adverse effects this has had on operations within 
Iraq and Afghanistan are visible, the restrictions are 
highlighted even more so in the irregular environments where 
USSF operates elsewhere. 
3. The Growing Need for Intelligence and the 
Restrictions Placed on Obtaining It 
The need for HUMINT has dramatically increased in the 
new threat environment of asymmetric warfare.20  National 
leaders and military commanders consistently turn to USSF 
for actionable intelligence against enemy targets and 
credible information regarding regional “atmospherics.”  At 
no point in the foreseeable future will this change, as the 
United States faces widely dispersed terrorist and insurgent 
                     
18 Stone, et al., Interrogation, 165. 
19 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 91. 
20 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64. 
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networks that cannot be identified simply through monitoring 
training sites and equipment concentrations via signal or 
imagery intelligence.21  However, because of decisions made 
to limit interrogation to “certified personnel,” based on 
what appears to be the fear of potential detainee abuse, a 
vast source for gathering information and intelligence has 
been placed “off-limits” to USSF.   
In 2004, the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention 
Operations released its findings and, regrettably, the 
doctrine put into place by FM 2-22.3 contradicts the panel’s 
findings in multiple areas. The panel found that there was a 
shortfall of properly trained human intelligence personnel 
to do tactical interrogation at all levels, and qualified 
interrogators were in short supply at larger detention 
centers.22  In its final recommendations, the panel states, 
“The nation needs more specialists for detention/ 
interrogation operations,” and yet the doctrine put forth 
within FM 2-22.3 specifically labels thousands of potential 
HUMINT collectors as being unauthorized to conduct this 
task.23  Where FM 34-52 allowed for all soldiers to conduct 
interrogations according to the standards of international 
law, the pendulum has now swung too drastically in the 
opposite direction. 
B. PURPOSE 
Any discussion of interrogation must begin with the 
simple reality that its purpose is to gain reliable 
                     
21 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64. 
22 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 63. 
23 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 90. 
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intelligence that will help protect the United States, U.S. 
forces, and U.S. interests abroad.24  Even the notorious 
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, produced by 
the CIA in 1963, defines interrogation as, “no more than 
obtaining needed information through responses to 
questions.”25  The purpose of this thesis is not to debate 
the definition of torture, or detainee rights commonly 
attached to discussions on interrogation, but to examine the 
role of interrogation as a critical tool in the current 
irregular conflict and to highlight the shortcomings of 
interrogation doctrine and policy specifically for USSF 
soldiers (and arguably other soldiers) and to demonstrate 
the need for USSF to receive interrogation training based on 
their doctrinally assigned core missions of unconventional 
warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense(FID).  It is 
because of these irregular core missions, which are specific 
to USSF, that interrogation must become an organic skill to 
the Special Forces. While the need for tactical 
interrogation exists within conventional units, the skills 
and authorities required could be supplemented if these 
units were placed within an irregular conflict on a case by 
case basis. The need for USSF Soldiers to conduct 
interrogation based on mission requirements currently exists 
around the globe. The inability of USSF to hold and 
interrogate detainees adversely affects the collection of 
reliable, actionable intelligence.  
                     
24 Department of Defense, Final Report of the Independent Panel to 
Review DoD Detention Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 61. 
25 Central Intelligence Agency, KUBARK Counterintelligence 
Interrogation (Washington DC: 1963), 1, 
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/CIA%20Kubark%201-60.pdf 
(accessed 1 March, 2011.) 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The necessity of USSF to possess the authority and 
receive training to conduct interrogations will be presented 
based on their mission, the exercises and operations they 
conduct, and the variations and types of enemy currently 
being faced. Various DoD reports will also be used to 
emphasize some shortfalls in U.S. interrogation doctrine and 
practices that address the inadequacies of the current 
doctrine. Case studies will be used to support the 
identified need for USSF to gain the training and authority 
to conduct interrogations. These cases will provide insight 
how current doctrine, policy, and a lack of proper training 
have handicapped the tactical level intelligence gathering 
of USSF. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II will highlight the need for USSF to possess 
interrogation skills, and the authority to use those skills 
inorder to accomplish current doctrinal missions. Chapter 
III provides several case studies that serve to illuminate 
the need for USSF to receive the necessary training and 
authority to conduct tactical interrogation. These studies 
provide insight as to how current doctrine, policy, and lack 
of training have handicapped tactical level intelligence 
collection by USSF.  Acknowledging the fact that the 
requirement for USSF to collect information will only 
increase, Chapter IV provides recommendations to alter 
current doctrine and authorities to provide the skills and 
training to facilitate USSF success on the modern irregular 
battlefield. Interrogation should be introduced to the SF 
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Qualification course, select personnel should receive 
additional training and certification upon arrival at the 
operational groups, and doctrine should be altered to 
provide authority for USSF to conduct interrogation with 
appropriate checks and balances.  
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II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERROGATION IN THE 
IRREGULAR ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that the scandal surrounding the 
treatment of prisoners of Abu Ghraib was a turning point for 
the United States. The public reaction forced national 
leaders to discuss the issues of prisoner detention and 
interrogation they had previously avoided addressing. It 
brought into focus the consequences of mishandling detainees 
and intelligence by various entities of the U.S. government 
during the prosecution of the conflicts following Al Qaeda’s 
attack on America in 2001.  In order to remedy these 
failures and weaknesses of the various systems within the 
U.S. military’s detention framework, the DoD developed and 
issued new doctrine in FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence 
Collector Operations. Highly restrictive in nature, this new 
doctrine severely limited the ability of all tactical units 
to gather HUMINT through interrogation at a time when these 
units were facing an ever-increasing irregular form of 
conflict. 
The primary threat facing the United States has changed 
significantly since September 11, 2001.  It is now irregular 
in nature and requires a fundamental reexamination of how 
intelligence is collected.26  In irregular warfare, the U.S. 
government needs detailed operational information about its 
adversaries as well as a deep strategic and cultural 
understanding of how the information fits together within a 
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larger mosaic.27  HUMINT is critical in irregular warfare, 
but U.S. HUMINT networks are commonly weakest precisely in 
the regions where terrorist and insurgent organizations that 
threaten U.S. national interests tend to thrive. Information 
derived from interrogations is a vital component of 
HUMINT.28  USSF are designed to operate and thrive in the 
irregular environment. Unlike conventional units, it is 
their “normal.”  The use of interrogation by USSF in these 
regions would provide a substantial increase in the amount 
of reliable and actionable information available at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.   
B. CONFRONTING THE CHANGING THREAT 
Terrorists and insurgents present new challenges to the 
United States because the variations in their organizational 
structures, methods of communication, and operational 
methodology differ significantly from the conventional 
threats the national security apparatus was designed to 
identify and defeat. Groups are decreasingly bound to a 
single geographic location or state and operate utilizing 
methods that make them difficult to observe and penetrate.29  
This new threat has highlighted the increased need for the 
HUMINT capabilities at the tactical level. To understand the 
criticality of HUMINT in the United States’ current 
struggle, the nature of the threat and conflict the nation 
is facing now and will likely face in the future must be 
understood. 
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Simply by comparing their definitions, one can identify 
the important difference in the nature of conventional and 
irregular warfare. One is focused on open conflict to defeat 
an enemy’s military forces; the other seeks to gain control 
and influence over a target population. Where an enemy can 
be defeated simply through an efficient application of 
overwhelming firepower on the conventional battlefield, 
irregular warfare requires the altering of the political 
variables among the target population to the point where the 
enemy becomes ineffectual.30  This does not require defeat 
of an enemy through attrition, but requires an understanding 
of the population to gain the trust and cooperation of the 
population on which the enemy relies on for survival. 
Because irregular warfare remains the weapon of the weak, 
military action to defeat them does not pose the challenge 
in this type of conflict.31  The problem of defeating an 
irregular enemy consists largely in finding him.32  
Understanding the differences in the nature of these two 
forms of warfare highlights the alterations that must take 
place within the U.S. intelligence system for success.   
Intelligence is required for success in all forms of 
warfare. Yet, because it is the decisive factor in 
conducting irregular operations, intelligence’s role 
increases in importance in this type of environment.33  On 
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the conventional battlefield, intelligence is often based 
primarily on technical intelligence, focused on monitoring 
massed forces and equipment at known military locations.34  
While this is effective against an opponent operating 
conventionally in a relatively linear manner, it lacks 
effectiveness in irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is 
fought by an unconventional enemy who strikes at a time and 
location of his choosing when the likelihood of success is 
weighted heavily in his favor.35  These enemies operate 
through widely dispersed networks. While the irregular enemy 
appears, at first glance, to have the tactical advantage, 
further inspection demonstrates this advantage comes instead 
from his informational superiority. This underscores the 
importance of intelligence in irregular warfare. Once the 
enemy is identified, it becomes a comparatively simple 
matter to dispose of him.36  Yet, with all of the United 
States’ superiority in military technology and weaponry, the 
most vital weapon in the U.S. arsenal might be 
interrogation.37  
Accordingly, the problem of defeating an irregular foe 
lies primarily in finding him. Thus, the importance of good 
intelligence and information cannot be overstated and often 
the only source of that information lies with the enemy 
himself.38  Moreover, the nature of the irregular foe means 
                     
34 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64. 
35 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 22. 
36 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95. 
37 Mark Bowden, “The Dark Art of Interrogation,” The Atlantic Monthly 
Online, October 2003, URL: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/10/bowden/2791/, 
accessed 28 May 2011. 
38 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95. 
 19
the potential intelligence is also highly perishable. While 
massed forces require time to redeploy, guerrillas or 
insurgents can seem to vanish in seconds. Intelligence must 
come from the local population and the combining of that 
intelligence with information derived from interrogations of 
high- and low-level detainees is an important component of 
HUMINT.39  Information gained from the population assists in 
understanding the operational environment. This is a 
significant difference between conventional and irregular 
warfare because a piece of information that is meaningless 
in conventional warfare, such as a local civic leader’s 
personal relationships, can be essential to gaining the 
support of a specific population. 
In irregular warfare, the understanding of a 
population’s mentality is arguably more important than 
understanding the enemy’s disposition. The prospects of an 
insurgent group or terrorist network depend upon the 
attitude of the population. The willingness of a population 
to aid the enemy by providing information and supplies, or 
by withholding information from the counterinsurgent is 
paramount.40  Gaining an accurate understanding of an 
operational area’s historical, political, and economic 
matters will allow for success because an irregular enemy 
can only survive with the support, passive, active, or 
coerced, of the masses.41  HUMINT is a resource that should 
be used to gain and confirm an accurate knowledge and 
understanding of these subjects. Interrogation conducted at 
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the point of capture, would provide better military 
information along with critical aspects of political, 
economic, technical information about the enemy and local 
population.42  This intelligence and information assists in 
separating the population from the enemy resulting in the 
population feeling secure enough to provide additional 
information. Therefore, proper interrogation at the lowest 
level combined with information gained through other means 
of HUMINT is critical to gaining popular support. 
Information superiority will bring victory and that can only 
be obtained through a constant and consistent interaction 
with all components of the local population. 
In his writings, Mao states that “the army must become 
one with the people so that they see it as their own army.”  
Debriefing is one tool that allows for this interaction to 
take place with a friendly or neutral population. 
Interrogation is another tool that allows for that same 
interaction with a hostile population. Unfortunately, at a 
time when the current conflict requires additional HUMINT to 
accurately identify and illuminate the enemy at the local 
level in order to most effectively separate them from the 
population, the doctrine presented in FM 2-22.3 denies the 
vast majority of U.S. soldiers the capability and authority 
to do so. 
C. THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL INTERROGATION 
The unique aspect of interrogation that sets it apart 
from other means of intelligence collection is that it 
allows for the gathering of intelligence through direct and 
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continuous contact with the enemy.43  It does not require 
interpretation of images or codes. It does not require 
humans to deduce the supposed meanings and importance of 
passively collected information. Interrogation provides the 
opportunity to determine exactly what was meant by a certain 
phrase in response to a question. Any uncertainties from 
questioning, and other questions that flow from the 
responses, can be addressed directly and immediately by the 
individual being interrogated. 
The feeling of omniscience provided throughout the Cold 
War and since by the imagery, signal, and communications 
intelligence assets available to the United States today has 
decreased the importance of gaining HUMINT through 
interrogations in some circles. Despite the lack of these 
technologies in World War II, many commanders even then 
failed to see the benefit of tactical interrogation on the 
battlefield, especially in the Pacific Theater. Early in the 
war, U.S. units captured very few enemy POWs. Commanders 
were reluctant to risk their men simply to capture Japanese 
soldiers—soldiers they were convinced would never disclose 
valuable intelligence.44  Through a slow process led by U.S. 
military interrogators within the tactical units, commanders 
began to realize the advantage that information taken from 
prisoners provided them on the battlefield. 
One of the most successful interrogators in the Pacific 
theater, Major Sherwood Moran, USMC, wrote of his 
experiences as an interrogator (he preferred the term 
“interviewer”) on Guadalcanal that, “we snatched prisoners 
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right off the battlefield while still bleeding, and the 
snipers were still sniping, and interviewed them as soon as 
they were able to talk.”45  Moran dispelled the standard 
U.S. attitude of the day that only the most severe coercive 
measures of interrogation would convince a captured Japanese 
soldier to divulge information. Moran believed “strong-arm 
tactics simply did not work.”46  Using his successes to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of tactical interrogation, 
Moran was able to establish a program that placed a large 
emphasis on Japanese culture and psychology, language 
expertise, and the humane treatment of Japanese POWs.47  The 
effectiveness of this interrogation program was highlighted 
during the landing on Saipan and Tinian, when interrogators 
had indentified the entire Japanese order of battle within 
the first 48 hours of fighting.48  The effectiveness of 
interrogation was again demonstrated when the interrogation 
programs implemented by the U.S. Army and Navy were credited 
with shortening the war in the Pacific by 2 years.49   
Tactical interrogation has been stressed by great 
military leaders throughout time. Sun Tzu stressed that, 
“foreknowledge…must be obtained from men who know the enemy 
situation.”50 Jomini declares interrogation is one of the 
most reliable sources of intelligence available to 
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commanders. 51  In the current irregular struggle that must 
be fought at the local level, the United States cannot 
afford to restrict the use of interrogation as a tool for 
the tactical commander. There is a clear need for tactical-
level interrogation to provide information on the location 
of the next ambush or the enemy sniper’s hide to protect the 
forces on the ground. If interrogation is held only to 
operational and strategic level commanders, the tactical 
units operating under those commanders will never function 
at a level of efficiency high enough to allow them to 
adequately understand their environment and defeat the 
enemy. 
D. TIME AND FLEXIBILITY 
The system of rapid interrogation and site 
exploitation would turn an initial operation into 
one or two more the same night. 
— Konrad Troutman, Senior Intelligence 
Officer for USSOCOM 
Timeliness is critical in all aspects of intelligence. 
This holds as true for strategic level intelligence as it 
does for intelligence at the tactical level. The maximum 
opportunity for gathering intelligence from a detainee comes 
in the first hours after detention through interrogation, 
before other members of the enemy organization can  
determine that their network has been breached. Once a 
suspect is known to be in custody, his intelligence value 
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falls.52 In its findings, The Independent Panel on DoD 
Detention Operations states,  
Interrogations provide commanders with 
information about enemy networks, leadership, and 
tactics. Such information is critical in planning 
operations. Tactically, detainee interrogation is 
a fundamental tool for gaining insight into enemy 
positions, strength, weapons, and intentions. 
Thus, it is fundamental to the protection of our 
force in combat.53   
What current doctrine fails to acknowledge is that 
these tactical commanders often need this information 
immediately. They do not have the time required to move a 
detainee to a DoD-approved facility and wait for a DoD-
certified interrogator (who only knows the details about the 
detainee that the tactical unit provides) to conduct an 
interrogation and then produce and send his report back to 
the original unit. During OIF, some detainees were in 
custody for as long as 90 days before being interrogated for 
the first time.54 
FM 2-22.3, however, completely ignores the necessity 
for tactical units to secure detainees at their level to 
gain and exploit any available tactical intelligence 
themselves. In Iraq and Afghanistan, tactical commanders 
understood the need to exploit the unique local knowledge 
possessed by detainees. These commanders kept detainees 
longer than doctrine allowed in order to gather details 
regarding religious and tribal affiliations and local 
politics, despite not being properly trained or resourced to 
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most effectively do so. The time with the tactical unit 
provided the opportunity for additional questioning, 
clarification, and confirmation of details. Tactical 
commanders were also concerned that information obtained in 
higher-level interrogation facilities would not be returned 
to the tactical unit.55  This concern is validated through 
the Independent Panel on DoD Detention Operations’ findings 
that there were a number of interrelated factors that 
limited the intelligence derived from interrogations, most 
notably, “a shortfall of properly trained HUMINT personnel” 
and a short supply of “qualified and experienced 
interrogators” at all levels.”56 
Rather than identifying these needs and providing 
training to support these operations, FM 2-22.3 focuses on 
the necessity of “rapid evacuation” of all detainees for 
their interrogation at the strategic and operational levels 
regardless of the fact that very few detainees have decisive 
information.57  By emphasizing the bottom-up movement of 
detainees, nothing was done to address the complete lack of 
top-down information flow as to intelligence and information 
gained in these interrogations.58  Even more disturbing was 
the restriction on who could conduct interrogations. Only a 
few certified personnel were authorized to interrogate, 
placing this critical tool out of the hands of tactical 
commanders regardless of the Independent Panel’s 
acknowledgement that “Tactically, detainee interrogation is 
a fundamental tool for gaining insight into enemy positions, 
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strength, weapons, and intentions. Thus, it is fundamental 
to the protection of our force in combat.”59   
The DoD has inadequately attempted to rectify this by 
emphasizing the use of tactical questioning (TQ).  TQ is 
defined as the “expedient initial questioning for 
information of immediate tactical value. TQ is generally 
performed by soldiers on patrols, but can be done by any DoD 
personnel.”60  Not only is TQ limited in the depth of its 
questions, it is also restricted by time allotted. Detainees 
are to be evacuated from the combat zone to a detention 
facility “within the minimum time after capture.”61  This 
highlights the weakness of current doctrine in irregular 
warfare as it allows only “professional” interrogators to 
conduct intelligence interrogations and leaves every other 
U.S. service member on the battlefield—from a truck driver 
to an SF intelligence sergeant—with only the tool of TQ.   
E. SEPARATING OURSELVES FROM TORTURE 
[The] barbarous custom of whipping men suspected 
of having important secrets to reveal must be 
abolished. It has always been recognized that 
this method of interrogation, by putting men to 
the torture, is useless. The wretches say 
whatever comes into their heads and whatever they 
think one wants to believe. Consequently, the 
Commander-in-Chief forbids the use of a method 
which is contrary to reason and humanity. 
— Napoleon Bonaparte, during the French 
military campaign in Egypt, 1798.62 
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Torture. It works . . . at least on some level. 
According to Bill Cowan, a Marine officer who served in 
Vietnam, “It worked like a charm.”  When he captured an 
uncooperative Vietcong soldier who could warn of ambushes or 
lead them to the enemy, wires were attached to the man's 
scrotum with alligator clips and electricity was produced 
out of a 110-volt generator.  “The minute the crank started 
to turn, he was ready to talk. We never had to do more than 
make it clear we could deliver a jolt. It was the fear more 
than the pain that made them talk.”63   
Old war stories like Cowan’s and Hollywood action films 
have taught the average American that simply “roughing up” a 
detained criminal will get him to talk. More importantly, 
when a U.S. soldier hears public comments by the president 
that coercive interrogations have “a proven track record of 
keeping America safe,” most would assume that the evidence 
supporting coercive techniques must be compelling.64  The 
facts show that this is simply not true. While torture might 
be redefined as “coercive means” or “enhanced interrogation 
techniques,” noncoercive interrogations have been much more 
successful and reliable in obtaining accurate information 
than coercive interrogations.65  Torture simply compels the 
detainee, through any means necessary, to perform an action 
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he would not otherwise commit under his own volition.66  
There is nowhere in the U.S. government or morale code where 
this is justified.    
Coercive interrogations can produce compliance, but 
compliance does not ensure reliable information. The 
waterboarding, prolonged standing, forced nudity, sleep 
deprivation, and exposure to extreme temperatures were all 
the products of those seeking to terrorize rather than to 
obtain truthful information.67  If a person does not die 
under torture or go into shock, he will typically say 
anything to get the torture to stop; even if some true 
statements are made, the interrogator will usually not be in 
a position to know which statement is true.68  This is 
particularly troublesome for interrogators attempting to 
gather actionable intelligence rather than a confession.69  
Jim Auld, arrested under suspicion of being an Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) terrorist, who was tortured and then 
found to be innocent, states, 
I would have told anybody anything. The 
interrogations were nothing for me because I 
wasn’t in a position to tell them what they 
wanted to know. I admitted to being in everything 
but the crib [with the baby Jesus in the manger], 
and if they asked me I would have said, ‘Yes, the 
crib as well, I’m in the background of it there,’ 
because I was just so frightened.70 
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Any truthful information obtained during interrogations 
involving torture is almost always corrupted by false data, 
false admissions, and unfounded speculations, all introduced 
by the individual being interrogated simply out of a desire 
to stop the terror or pain.71  The problem with these 
techniques is that rarely is the information gained 
worthwhile and never is it worth the cost of becoming a 
nation that condones and conducts torture. Coercive 
interrogations are rarely necessary for gaining actionable 
intelligence.72 
Because the United States’ current conflicts are each 
irregular in nature, the importance of good intelligence and 
information cannot be emphasized enough during discussion on 
this topic. This intelligence must come from the local 
population and torture will only serve to drive it away. 
Countries that use coercive interrogation techniques have 
not solved their problems of insurgency and terrorism, but 
those that have abandoned or never used them have reaped 
more success.73  The British in Northern Ireland, for 
example, adopted coercive interrogations of terrorist 
suspects. An IRA Commander reported that these interrogation 
methods were “the best recruiting tools the IRA ever had.”74   
In a conflict where victory will be obtained by 
altering the feelings of the population away from supporting 
the enemy, “counterproductive” does not begin to describe 
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the harm that torture does to a nation’s reputation. The 
mere perception of the use of torture can significantly harm 
a nation’s reputation. Because it allowed itself to dabble 
in coercive techniques considered torture, America’s 
reputation has been tarnished. The damage from Abu Ghraib 
will affect the United States for years, especially 
throughout the Middle East. Terrorist recruitment has 
increased and foreign governments are hesitant to cooperate 
with the United States.75  While Bill Cowan’s alligator 
clips may have worked in the short run, the Viet Cong won 
the war. The United States cannot afford to be shortsighted 
and ethically misaligned as it continues to fight the 
current conflicts around the globe. It cannot successfully 
fight a war against terrorism while applying a terrorist 
tactic. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The enemy is changing. The United States can no longer 
afford to primarily focus on monitoring massed forces and 
equipment through technical means without the benefit of 
exploiting HUMINT networks as well. The enemy is now 
operating in widely dispersed networks and utilizing methods 
of communication and operational techniques that differ 
significantly from the conventional threats the national 
security apparatus was designed to identify and defeat. 
HUMINT capabilities must be adapted and altered to 
effectively illuminate and counter these new threats. And 
yet counter to this, doctrine mandated and enforced through 
an executive order completely restricts the vast majority of 
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U.S. service members conducting operations in support of 
national interests around the globe. One of the most 
accessible and potentially valuable sources for this exact 
type of intelligence, the interrogation of detainees is now 
“off limits” on the front line. 
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III. WHY SPECIAL FORCES? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Special Forces soldiers are on the front lines of 
numerous irregular conflicts around the globe. They possess 
both the ability to gather HUMINT and a high understanding 
of the operational environment militarily and socially. 
Because of these abilities, there is immense pressure for SF 
soldiers to provide timely intelligence gained firsthand 
from the battlefield. National political and military 
leadership must not, however, make the mistake of simply 
granting USSF the authority to conduct tactical 
interrogations without providing the necessary training. The 
following sections show the need for this training by 
discussing the extreme difference between the defensive 
interrogation training (how to resist interrogation) 
currently conducted by USSF and the offensive interrogation 
training (how to conduct interrogation) needed to conduct 
effective interrogations, the necessity to reinforce 
national policy that clearly bans all coercive interrogation 
methods, and the operational requirement to conduct 
interrogations in irregular warfare. 
B. WHY SF? 
No soldier has a better understanding of his 
operational environment than those in Special Forces. The 
focus on local customs, cultures, and language inherent in 
USSF allows for the development of information networks that 
provide details on all aspects of local life from enemy 
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troop movements to the political standings of a village 
based on tribal affiliations. The core missions of UW and 
FID require a high level of autonomy and self-sufficiency 
allowing USSF to operate in an extremely agile manner based 
on the needs of the indigenous forces are working with. With 
this autonomy and the speed at which they operate, the 
requirement to transport every detainee to a certified 
interrogator at the operational or strategic level degrades 
effectiveness.   
USSF operates worldwide. Due to the mission to train 
various entities of other nations, it is an organization 
focused on working by, with, and through indigenous 
populations and is formed around geographical and cultural 
areas of focus. USSF continually conducts missions in 
support of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) 
conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises 
and Counter Narco-Terrorism (CNT) missions everywhere from 
Algeria to Mongolia and Columbia to Jordan. The nature of 
these operations not only put USSF in the right locations to 
gather needed information on local capabilities and threats, 
but their understanding of the region and population 
provides additional context concerning which information is 
important to commanders and decision makers at the 
operational and strategic levels of conflict. 
USSF has often provided a platform for the testing and 
evaluating new tactics and technologies for their potential 
adaptation by larger components of the U.S. Army. This 
allows for the new item to be thoroughly stressed and 
modified prior to a full investment being made. Applying 
this same model to the practice of tactical interrogation 
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would allow for the training and execution of interrogation 
to be evaluated by USSF and if successful those skills and 
authorities could be transferred to conventional tactical 
level units that need this skill on a case by case basis 
when tasked to operate in an irregular environment. 
1. The Mission 
In a recent interview, MG Bennet Sacolick, Commander of 
the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School, clearly described the mission of the U.S. Army 
Special Forces,  
We're the only force specifically trained and 
educated to train and work with indigenous 
forces. Not hunting them down and killing them, 
but working with them to build partner 
capacity…We're not designed to hunt people down 
and kill them. We have that capability and we 
have forces that specialize in that. But 
ultimately what we do that nobody else does is 
work with our indigenous partner nations.76   
Training partner forces to increase their effectiveness 
is the reason USSF was created. USSF focuses its training 
skills through the execution of two primary missions: 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare 
(UW).  Each of these missions centers around working by, 
with, and through an indigenous force to either support a 
government in power, FID, or to counter a government in 
power, UW.  By receiving training on proper interrogation 
techniques, USSF could better influence the conduct of 
interrogations conducted by their partner forces on JCETs 
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and CNTs. This training would not only improve the standing 
of the USSF providing the training with its partner force, 
but would often provide the only opportunity for a U.S. 
entity to influence the host nation’s interrogation 
techniques because USSF are often the only U.S. force 
foreign security forces are ever exposed to. Knowledge of 
proper interrogation techniques would increase the 
legitimacy of partner forces and undermine the narrative of 
the enemy. 
a. The SF Mission of Unconventional Warfare 
(UW) 
Nothing provides a clearer example of the 
requirement for USSF to possess interrogation skills and the 
authority to conduct interrogations than its core mission of 
Unconventional Warfare (UW).  UW is defined as: 
Activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or 
overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.77   
UW is the primary reason for the existence of USSF 
as an organization within the U.S. armed forces. UW is an 
element of IW, but it takes place solely within an area 
under enemy or unfriendly control. The intent of U.S. UW 
efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, 
economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing 
and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. 
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strategic objectives.78  For an SF Operational Detachment-
Alpha (SFODA) conducting UW alongside a guerrilla force 
against a hostile government, FM 2-22.3 is unrealistic. It 
would be impossible for the SFODA to evacuate every detainee 
from deep inside denied enemy territory for interrogation 
simply because of the risk to force and mission in a denied 
area. Most of these detainees would possess tactical level 
information that would be of limited use at higher levels. 
Any form of intelligence and analytical support coming from 
the slower moving operational and strategic levels of the 
unconventional conflict would be too far removed to keep up 
with the details and rapidly changing realities that are 
required to keep the guerrillas and SFODA alive and 
operating efficiently.   
Cohesive integration with the guerrilla force is 
critical for mission success in the UW environment. The 
members of the SFODA are considered outsiders and rely on 
the local guerrillas and their support networks for security 
and supplies. In turn, the SFODA members provide the 
guerrillas training on tactical level tasks. Information is 
critical in this environment and with current doctrine an 
SFODA is handicapped by an inability to gather intelligence 
through the means of interrogations. The SFODA also has no 
training on conducting interrogations so they are unable to 
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techniques. The option of attaching a trained interrogator 
to the SFODA prior to their infiltration would only be seen 
as a hindrance.79 
In his book, An Ethics of Interrogation, Michael 
Skerker makes the following statement specifically about 
interrogators operating in a UW environment:  
For interrogators to be successful in UW, the 
need to either accompany troops in the field-
where they can direct, or act closely in concert 
with the ranking officer to direct, the 
investigative aspects of the mission including 
tactical screening, document recovery, and 
searches after a site has been secured…Troops in 
the field as well as interrogators need to be 
better trained in the investigative aspects of 
unconventional warfare, which in particular 
theaters will involve intensive cultural training 
so that they are better able to distinguish 
genuinely suspicious behavior from behavior that 
is normal in the local behavior.80 
USSF easily conducts each of these tasks: they 
live in the field beside their indigenous force, understand 
local cultures, possess the training to effectively exploit 
tactical successes, and have the knowledge and resources to 
validate local information. Skerker goes on to say, “Critics 
will object that extra training costs money, but ineffective 
operations born of inadequate training are costlier.”81  If 
USSF already possess many of the required skills to be 
                     
79 It could be argued here that attaching an interrogator to a 
Special Forces Detachment would be no different than attaching a U.S. 
Air Force TAC-P.  U.S. Army interrogators, however, to not possess any 
of the additional tactical capabilities that SOF personnel such as Tac-
Ps are proficient in. Even if they did possess these capabilities, the 
interrogator would not be educated or trained in conducting UW 
operations.   
80 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 181. 
81 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 181. 
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effective UW interrogators and leadership at every level 
expects detailed information about the enemy from USSF, can 
the U.S. government afford the price of not teaching this 
skill to UW forces?   
b. The SF Mission of Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) 
Defined as “Participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken 
by another government or other designated organization to 
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism or other threats to its security,” FID 
is the U.S. government’s support to a host nation to assist 
with internal defense and development to promote its growth 
and protect itself from both internal and external security 
threats.82  The capabilities that SF employ to perform its 
FID mission are those inherent to its UW mission; only the 
operational environment is changed. A FID operation can 
include any number of tasks including training and advisory 
assistance, humanitarian assistance, psychological 
operations, and even combat operations. The need for these 
tasks will vary from nation to nation. One host nation may 
request assistance to combat drug trafficking, while another 
may desire counterinsurgency training. The overall goal for 
a FID mission, however, does not change: to assist the host 
nation in combating internal threats while increasing its 
legitimacy and influence over its population.    
While FID can be conducted by conventional forces, 
it is a core mission for USSF.  Their knowledge of the 
                     
82 Joint Publication 3-22 “Foreign Internal Defense,” 12 July 2010, 
ix. 
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language, customs, and political situations of a particular 
region increase their effectiveness in this mission. Most 
often they are tasked with training and advising the host 
nation’s security forces. While this provides the 
opportunity to increase host nation capabilities, it often 
ties USSF to a security unit’s actions long after USSF are 
gone. USSF could better influence interrogations conducted 
by their partner forces during FID missions given training 
on proper interrogation techniques. This would result in an 
increased probability that the host nation force would use 
these techniques after USSF had completed its mission, thus 
increasing the legitimacy of the host nation government and 
its forces Providing interrogation training to its host 
nation partner forces would provide an opportunity to 
influence the host nation’s interrogation techniques in a 
way that enhances the legitimacy of that government. 
2. The Men 
Over the past 70 years, various personal traits have 
been identified within individuals who were considered to be 
effective interrogators: intelligent, personable, tenacious, 
worldly, experienced, humane, and managerial.83  The 
abilities to cultivate and sustain productive relationships 
and possess an aptitude toward culture and language appear 
to be key.84  One would be hard pressed to find a USSF 
commander who would not use most of these same traits to 
describe his ideal Green Beret. The final common trait is an 
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exceptional aptitude for dealing with ambiguity.85  Any 
soldier who has deployed as a member of USSF is accustomed 
to operating within rapidly changing environments under 
minimal guidance. They were chosen due to their ability to 
operate effectively in ambiguous situations. Because these 
are the traits the SF Regiment uses to select it operators, 
it could be argued that with training, USSF are likely to be 
among the most effective interrogators in DoD. 
C. UNLEARNING WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW 
Every member of the Special Forces Regiment is required 
to successfully complete the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 
and Escape (SERE) course. Designed to give graduates the 
skills needed to resist against the enemy during evasion and 
following capture, it will no doubt prove to be priceless 
training in the event that a soldier ever has to endure the 
hardships of captivity. Despite the obvious importance of 
this skill set to USSF given the inherent high risk of 
capture during operations, not one USSF soldier has been 
placed into a situation that required the implementation of 
the defensive interrogation skills taught at SERE during the 
combat of the past decade. Conversely, the vast majority of 
USSF who have deployed over that same time period have 
interacted in some manner or fashion with a detainee. Yet, 
no portion of the current doctrine addresses training USSF 
for interrogation operations. 
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Prior to discussing the reasons for USSF interrogation 
training, a quick glance must be taken at the errors of 
“what we think we know.”  SERE training includes an 
introduction to the process of interrogation. These periods 
of instruction are intense and often violent and each 
trainee will carry the lessons learned for a lifetime. But 
these lessons are designed to teach a student how to resist 
interrogation (both coercive and noncoercive), not to 
conduct it. Defensive interrogation training, like that 
experienced in SERE, is designed to help personnel withstand 
the unique stresses of coercive interrogation to protect 
information and avoid their becoming pawns in an adversary’s 
attempt to generate propaganda.86  The U.S. government has 
understandably spent countless dollars and man hours 
studying the hostile and coercive interrogation methods 
employed by totalitarian regimes and hostile non-state 
actors around the globe in order to better prepare service 
members to endure and survive if captured. However, no 
similar effort has ever been undertaken to prepare personnel 
for their important role in gleaning information from 
prisoners and detainees.87   It is precisely this lack of 
understanding in the differences between defensive 
interrogation training and effective interrogation skills 
that lead USSF soldiers to inappropriately conduct tactical 
questioning in just the same manner as their SERE 
instructors did to them.   
Interrogators within a totalitarian regime (and SERE 
instructors) are working toward a specific end state: 
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propaganda. Their methods, both coercive and noncoercive, 
are focused on gaining data that can be used to promote the 
cause of the regime, such as a signed confession by a 
service member “admitting” to a war crime in order to 
discredit the U.S. government. USSF are focused on a 
completely different end state: accurate information and 
situational understanding. What ultimately informs the 
methodology employed to collect information from a source is 
the nature of the information sought.88  It is vital that a 
true understanding of the desired end state of an 
interrogation is required. 
Given the immediate and future requirements for 
intelligence and the current misunderstanding of the 
application of interrogation techniques, one can begin to 
visualize how cases of detainee abuse come about. In study 
after study, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that 
inadequate interrogation training and improper interrogation 
protocols undoubtedly led to abuse of detainees.89  USSF 
soldiers must be trained in the art and science of 
interrogation in order to provide them with the skills 
necessary to fill intelligence gaps without having to 
reverse engineer their own experiences from SERE training.   
Failure to do so while increasing the pressure on USSF to 
provide accurate and actionable intelligence is courting 
detainee abuse. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Because of their missions to train partner nation 
forces and execute UW, USSF need the training and authority 
to conduct tactical interrogation. The high level of 
autonomy required to execute their core missions and their 
continual involvement in tactical, operational, and 
strategic level operations demand it. USSF are mature, 
highly trained and carefully selected soldiers. The nation 
increasingly turns to them to fill intelligence requirements 
in light of current irregular threats. Leadership should 
acknowledge that, without altering doctrine to allow USSF to 
conduct tactical interrogation, the ever-expanding need for 
accurate and actionable intelligence on the irregular 
battlefield will not be effectively filled. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Despite a lack of formal interrogation training the 
examples provided in the following case studies illustrate 
the value and necessity of tactical level units to be able 
to conduct interrogation at their level. First, then-CPT 
Stuart Harrington was able to gain critical insight into the 
irregular conflict he faced as an advisor in South Vietnam. 
These insights provided him the knowledge to increase his 
effectiveness through a better understanding of both his 
enemy and his allies. Second, a SFODA conducting 
interrogations in support of its mission during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom stumbles upon a detainee that is not only 
willing to provide timely and accurate information, but who 
will eventually work for USSF to combat the growing 
insurgency. These two cases highlight the type of 
intelligence that can only be gained in an irregular 
conflict through tactical units conducting interrogation 
operations. The final case illuminates the importance of 
proper interrogation training when an untrained SFODA in 
Afghanistan applies improper techniques during interrogation 
that ultimately result in the death of a detainee. Each of 
these cases occurred prior to the implementation of current 
doctrine. 
The final case study is from the author’s experiences 
as a SF ODA commander in Iraq following Abu Ghraib and the 
implementation of FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations. The conflict in Iraq had shifted from a 
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conventional invasion, to an insurgency, to a civil war, and 
by 2007 the country was again facing an insurgency. Other 
than the initial invasion, all of this conflict fell 
squarely into the realm of irregular warfare. Despite the 
need for more information to succeed against the insurgents, 
the new doctrine regarding interrogations outlawed this tool 
from tactical commanders in the field. The examples provided 
in the final case study demonstrate the negative effects 
current doctrine has on tactical level units’ abilities to 
gather the very information that increases their operational 
effectiveness. 
B. COL STUART A. HARRINGTON 
Then-CPT Stuart “Stu” Harrington arrived in Vietnam in 
1971 following a short break in service. He had been 
commissioned into the military intelligence branch of the 
U.S. Army in 1967, completed an assignment in Berlin, and 
then returned to civilian life. Bored with his new career 
choice, Harrington reentered the Army knowing he would be 
sent to Vietnam. In preparation for his assignment there, he 
attended the Tactical Intelligence Officer Course, the 
Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course, and a 
three-month course in Vietnamese.90 
CPT Harrington was assigned to the Hau Nghia province 
as a Phoenix Program advisor. His mission was to work with 
the South Vietnamese Army and police units in the province 
to neutralize any Vietcong insurgents located there. 
Harrington soon lost faith in the ability of the Phoenix 
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Program to succeed due to a lack of commitment on the part 
of his South Vietnamese counterparts. It was at this time he 
began to conduct unilateral debriefings of Vietcong 
defectors armed with only his general intelligence training 
on how to handle defectors. These interrogations not only 
provided insight on Vietcong operations, but also provided 
inspection into the realities of why the Vietcong were 
fighting at all.91 
Taking advantage of the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) 
program, Herrington gained access to numerous former 
Vietcong. The interrogations were conducted in a manner 
completely opposite of anything most of the former Vietcong 
had anticipated. They were placed in a hospitable 
environment, provided refreshments, and were never treated 
in a harsh or unfriendly manner. Herrington wore civilian 
clothes and used a translator as little as possible. He 
conducted extensive research on the detainee’s admitted 
former village and the Vietcong units in that area of 
operation in order to demonstrate knowledge and therefore 
decrease the probability of being misled.92   
With the knowledge and understanding of what was 
occurring militarily on the ground in his province, 
Harrington was able to gain additional information that 
divulged the hidden realities of both sides of the 
insurgency in Vietnam. The information revealed that South 
Vietnamese government officials at the local levels chose 
not to combat the Vietcong in their area out of fear of 
condemnation by their own leadership, and the fear of being 
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targeted by the Vietcong for assassination. It provided 
social insights that depicted the Vietnamese as a people who 
would never turn a fellow Vietnamese native (even if the 
person was an enemy) over to a foreign invader, showed that 
the “Vietnamese way” demanded contempt for foreigners be 
concealed (even the South Vietnamese officers toward their 
U.S. advisors), and divulged that the majority of the 
population continually shifted sides to whomever they 
believed was winning at the moment. Harrington also learned 
the primary reason the Vietcong were able to gather the 
support of, or at least be tolerated by, the population in 
the south was the revulsion over the South Vietnamese 
government’s high level of corruption, opposition to its 
land reform campaign, and the mishandling of mandatory 
relocation programs that had been dictated from Saigon. It 
was the lack of ability by the Americans to understand the 
importance of these “non-military” aspects of the conflict 
that caused failures in implementing effective 
counterinsurgency initiatives alongside their South 
Vietnamese allies.93 
C. AN ODA’S ABILITY TO SEIZE UPON OPPORTUNITY 
Prior to the Abu Ghraib scandal and the doctrinal 
changes that followed, tactical level units were allowed to 
conduct interrogations. While these units were permitted by 
the doctrine and policies in place at the time to 
interrogate detainees, most had not been provided any 
training on how to conduct these types of operations. The 
following case study highlights the opportunities this 
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doctrinal freedom presented to these tactical units and the 
potential for increasing the information gained in this type 
of situation through the implementation of an offensive 
interrogation training program.   
After several months operating in the extremely fluid 
combat environment of Iraq in late 2003, the ODA out of 10th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) had been in many situations 
for which it was not specifically trained. Like any good 
ODA, its members had adapted and improvised toward the goal 
of success. Finding themselves with a continually growing 
number of detainees and no outside support to question them, 
the ODA naturally assumed the role of interrogators. Despite 
having no training on the conduct of interrogation, or 
having been specifically tasked to conduct them, 
interrogations became an inherent and essential part of the 
operational cycle: 
1. Gather information about a target 
2. Interdict the target 
3. Develop information from the interdiction 
(interrogate detainees, conduct sensitive site 
exploitation) 
4. Identify new targets from information provided by 
the detainee and documents 
Each step was dependent on the one previous to it. If 
one was removed, or not completed, the ODA was relegated 
back to step 1.94 
Following an unsuccessful raid against an insurgent 
arms dealer, the ODA found itself with a detainee from 
Baghdad, Hadr, who appeared willing to provide information. 
The team had conducted dozens of tactical interrogations in 
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the field using various expedient methods with varied levels 
of success, but on this night the detachment commander made 
the decision to approach this interrogation differently.95  
Rather than keep the detainee uncomfortably cold and 
confront him with a hostile barrage of questions inside a 
dimly lit, hollowed-out building with the feel of a dungeon 
as had been the case with past detainees, the ODA conducted 
the interrogation in their basement. It was “the most 
American room in the house” complete with TV, Playstation 
II, and exercise equipment. Hadr was placed on the couch and 
provided Iraqi tea, snacks, and cigarettes. He was shown 
hospitality rather than aggression.96   
Most importantly, the team had a plan. Not having to 
rush Hadr to a detention facility allowed the team to choose 
the time, location, environment, and detachment personnel 
for conducting the interrogation. They were able to set the 
environment to take full advantage of this detainee’s 
knowledge of the local social intricacies and determine if 
he possessed information that would be of value at higher 
levels. The plan worked. Hadr had been so taken by the ODA’s 
hospitality and generosity that the first hour of the 
interrogation was completely filled with his providing 
information on insurgent recruiting, IED tactics, and other 
“non-military” aspects of the insurgency with minimal 
questioning.97 
The ODA then directed the conversation toward the 
targeted arms dealer. Hadr provided information on the arms 
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dealer’s pattern of life, safe houses, and weapon cache 
sites. He eventually volunteered to escort the ODA on a 
mission to physically identify the locations he had 
discussed. The interrogation had not only provided 
intelligence that assisted the ODA in capturing the arms 
dealer, it had presented the opportunity to initiate the 
operational cycle against additional targets in the area.98  
Hadr returned to Baghdad continuing to supply information to 
other ODAs conducting operations there. He would later 
provide crucial information on the bombing of the UN 
building in August 2003.99   
This experience is similar to that Stuart Harrington in 
Vietnam and interrogators of World War II such as Hans 
Scharff (see Appendix C) and Sherwood Moran (see Appendix 
D).  While both Moran and Scharff operated in a completely 
conventional conflict, the methods they employed with 
legendary success would be extremely beneficial in irregular 
warfare for both gathering intelligence and to increase the 
legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the population by 
conducting noncoercive interrogations. It must be remembered 
that what is key to this case study is not the suggestion 
that every detainee will turn completely based on positive 
treatment, but that the ODA had the flexibility to employ 
this technique, the ground knowledge to exploit Hadr, and 
the chance to build a level of trust that allowed them to 
turn a prisoner into a cooperative asset. 
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D. THE COST OF INSUFFICIENT TRAINING 
Early on during the war in Afghanistan, USSF firebases 
were often the first stop for a detainee. From there the 
detainee faced a number of potential fates: release, 
transfer to the local Afghan authorities, transfer to U.S. 
detention facilities in Bagram or potentially Guantanamo 
Bay. It was in these firebases that some USSF personnel 
began conducting their own interrogations based on nothing 
more than assumptions and physical violence. In late 2002, 
high-ranking Special Operations leadership and officials 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross shared 
expressed concern about a rash of reports highlighting an 
extremely high level of physical abuse of detainees at these 
firebases. It was during this time that one ODA from the 
20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), ODA 2021 stationed at 
Gardez firebase, allegedly tortured a detainee to death.100 
The guidelines for holding detainees and conducting 
interrogations had been issued to all the Special Forces 
units upon deployment to Afghanistan. The commander had 
redistributed these same guidelines when reports of detainee 
abuses had begun to appear in reporting. Then LTG Dan 
McNeill, commander of all U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, 
had stressed the need to segregate detainees with ties to Al 
Qaeda or the Taliban for transportation to Bagram and 
instituted a 96-hour time period for tactical level 
commanders to make this determination. In the irregular 
environment, it was often difficult to determine a 
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detainee’s level of involvement with these groups. 
Accordingly, latitude was given to the tactical commanders 
to detain any suspects “who pose a threat” or “who may have 
intelligence value.”  There was also some ambiguity with the 
96-hour limit due to delays in transportation assets or 
units hoping to extract additional intelligence.101 
ODA 2021 appears to have had several issues that 
climaxed in the death of a detainee due. Weak leadership and 
a lack of understanding of their mission are apparent in the 
reporting between the ODA and their higher headquarters. For 
an organization tasked with working by, with, and through 
the local Afghan political and military leadership to gain 
the support and influence over the local population, the ODA 
undermined their own efforts.102   
It was on one of these raids that Jamal Naseer, an 
eighteen-year-old Afghan army recruit, was detained along 
with his brother, Parre, and six others. Following the raid 
on March 5, 2003, the eight men were bound and hooded. The 
detainees were transported to Gardez firebase where the 
physical abuse began immediately upon their arrival. Parre 
claims to have been beaten, kicked, doused with cold water, 
and forced to stay on his knees until “we lost the sensation 
in our legs and couldn’t walk.”103   
Over the next eleven days, the detainees were 
questioned and abused while the ODA reported to its higher 
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headquarters that “A lot of intelligence was being 
generated” and that the detainees were “still undergoing 
interviews.”  These “interviews” consisted of rounds being 
fired near the detainees’ heads, beatings with fists, boots, 
and other items designed to deliver blunt trauma to the 
body, and even the removal of toenails. The questioning that 
went along with this torture appears to have been haphazard 
and unplanned, ranging from local information on control of 
the roads to interaction with Al Qaeda leadership and 
international travel. Parre claims that, at one point, an 
Afghan interpreter pleaded with him to give the 
interrogators the information they were searching for, 
telling him to “Just say anything to make them stop.”104 
According to military records, the ODA had determined 
after the first two days that the detainees did not need to 
be transported to Bagram, and yet the ODA leadership kept 
possession of all eight men for an additional nine days. 
During this time, an additional two men were detained, 
beaten, and dunked into icy water to the point of nearly 
drowning. Both were released the next day with a report to 
the ODA’s headquarters that the two men had been 
cooperative.   
Parre claims that Jamal had been subjected to the 
harshest interrogation because, as the youngest of the eight 
detainees, he was perceived as being the most vulnerable. 
Jamal had complained to Parre during their detention about 
pain in his back and kidneys and told him about being forced 
to stand with his arms and legs spread apart while 
interrogators took turns beating him. On or around March 16, 
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Jamal died. Parre was told by a member of the ODA that he 
had died from an illness—a stomach ailment, not at the hands 
of the Americans.105  He claims to have responded, “My 
brother was healthy. His brain, his heart, his legs, he was 
not sick. He had no history of sickness or injury in any 
part of his body. He died because of your cruelty.”  A local 
hospital worker who prepared Jamal’s body for burial claims 
“it was completely black” and the face was “completely 
swollen, as were his palms, and the soles of his feet were 
swollen double in size.”106 
Following Jamal’s death, the ODA arranged with the 
district governor to have the remaining detainees 
transferred to the local jail. A local physician examined 
the prisoners. He claims the men were battered, bruised, and 
had untreated, open wounds and Parre’s feet were black from 
blunt-force trauma. The remaining seven detainees spent a 
total of 58 days in captivity and no charges were ever filed 
against any of them.107  It is unclear whether the ODA 
gained any intelligence of any value during the detention 
and torture of Jamal and the seven others.108   
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E. AN ODA’S OPPORTUNITY LOST TO INADEQUATE TRAINING 
The RKG-3 is an anti-tank hand grenade designed by the 
Soviet Union during the cold war. It looks like a soup can 
with a handle coming out of the bottom. What makes this 
grenade so lethal is that, unlike normal hand grenades that 
explode in a uni-directional manner, the RKG-3 has a shaped 
charge that focuses the intensity of the explosive into a 
single point of impact. This allows it to cut through 
armored vehicles that would deflect the fragmentation from a 
normal hand grenade. By late 2007, these grenades had become 
the weapon of choice for Iraqi insurgents targeting the U.S. 
convoys running up and down the highways between FOBs. Their 
lethality and effectiveness made locating the grenades and 
anyone storing or employing them a top priority. 
The ODA had verified through a local informant that Ali 
had been selling RKG-3s out of his place of business. Ali 
owned a small toy store located in the local bazaar area. 
Once the location of Ali’s home and business were confirmed 
through other sources, the ODA planned a raid with the Iraqi 
SWAT on the home that would be followed by a raid on the toy 
store. The front gate and door were unlocked, which allowed 
the entire assault force to enter and secure the house 
silently. Before Ali and his family could even comprehend 
what was happening, 25 armed men suddenly appeared in their 
house. Ali and the other males were separated for 
identification and tactical questioning, while the women 
were placed into a room containing the still-sleeping 
children. Tactical questioning and the search of the home 
had resulted in nothing of significant interest being 
discovered. 
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The assault team loaded back into its vehicles with Ali 
and two other men and prepared for the raid on the toy 
store. A surveillance team had been put in place to watch 
the bazaar to determine if the raid on Ali’s house would 
cause anyone to panic and attempt to retrieve any hidden 
evidence from the toy store. No movement had been observed 
and so the raid force moved through the blacked out 
neighborhoods of Tikrit to secure the bazaar.   
Two large steel doors that were secured by a huge 
padlock covered the front of the toy store. Ali didn’t have 
the key with him and the demolitions expert on the ODA was 
more than happy at the chance to remove the lock with high 
explosives. After the lock was blown, the SWAT began to 
search the toy store for anything that could be used as 
evidence to hold Ali. During the search, two ODA members and 
two SWAT members continued the tactical questioning of Ali 
and the two other men from his house. Emotions were up. 
These guys had access to the same RKG-3s that were killing 
Americans. Two soldiers had been killed a few streets over 
by the grenades less than a week earlier.   
After a half-hour with no sign of anything resembling 
an RKG-3, the SWAT began to ratchet up the questioning of 
Ali. The ODA members, having nothing but their SERE training 
to draw upon for experience in interrogations, increased 
their hostility of questioning as well. The tactical 
questioning was now being conducted through the “bad cop-bad 
cop” technique, but time was running short and the raid 
force needed evidence. Just as the tactical questioning was 
turning dangerously close to coercive means, one of the SWAT 
members claimed that he had found something. In the air 
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conditioning unit attached to Ali’s toy store was a white 
rice bag containing two Chinese 60mm mortar rounds and three 
complete RKG-3s.   
While coercive means were not used in this situation, 
the potential for them is easily recognizable. Training 
provided to the ODA on how to properly interrogate would not 
only have made them more effective, but would have allowed 
them to train the Iraqi SWAT, who all too often demonstrated 
a quick tendency to implement the coercive means they had 
witnessed during Saddam’s rule. As with the previous case, 
the doctrinally imposed timelines, the lack of access to 
detainees, and the minimal amount of information passed back 
to the tactical unit from the detention facility only create 




The United States entered the current conflicts with 
interrogation doctrine built upon its experiences in World 
War II and the Cold War. The U.S. government had failed to 
conduct additional investigative research in the area of 
offensive interrogation strategies since the 1960s.109 FM 2-
22.3 was introduced to remedy the issues of abuse, but has 
resulted in handicapping the abilities of those tactical 
forces on the front lines that are most likely to require 
intelligence simply for survival. The requirement placed on 
these forces to provide large volumes of actionable 
intelligence has, however, only continued to steadily 
increase over time.   
Current interrogation doctrine is a misfit for the 
irregular conflicts the nation is facing around the globe 
today. United States forces are not operating on a linear 
battlefield, and the information they need to be most 
effective cannot be determined by counting tanks with 
satellites. It must come from the population within which 
the enemy hides and from the enemy himself in order to 
effectively separate the population from the enemy. Most of 
assortment of enemy personnel and local population who are 
in the wrong place at the wrong time that are detained on 
the battlefield will possess little to no critical 
intelligence, but they may hold a piece of the larger 
puzzle. Forcing each and every detainee to operational and 
                     
109 Robert Fein, “U.S. Experience and Research in Educing 
Information: A Brief History,” in Educing Information—Interrogation: 
Science and Art, ed. Robert Fein (Washington DC: National Defense 
Intelligence College, 2006), xiii. 
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strategic level detention facilities for interrogation 
wastes the time and energy of the certified interrogators at 
those levels and detracts from their interfacing with 
detainees who do possess critical intelligence. The fact 
that detainees reach the higher-level detention facilities 
with minimal data about their capture or background also 
decreases the effectiveness of the interrogators at those 
levels. 
Rather than relying on doctrine and techniques designed 
for a conventional conflict where hundreds of young 
interrogators with limited life experience will interrogate 
hundreds of young prisoners with limited life experience and 
tactical knowledge, changes must be made to restore the 
flexibility of USSF to conduct lawful interrogation and 
provide them the tools to do so correctly. Adoption of these 
changes will have a significant impact for DoD to gather 
needed intelligence in the irregular conflicts of today and 
the future. 
A. BEGIN WITH U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
Historically, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have 
provided a platform for the testing and evaluating tactics 
and technologies that could be adapted later to fit the 
larger U.S. Army. This allows for the new item to be 
thoroughly stressed and modified prior to a full investment 
being made towards issuing the item to the entire force. 
Applying this same model to the practice of tactical 
interrogation would allow for the recommendations included 
in this thesis to be incorporated and adjusted to meet the 
demands of USSF.  Conventional tactical level units that 
need this skill based on being tasked to operate in an 
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irregular environment could be trained and granted the 
authority by exception and informed experience of USSF. 
USSF possesses the need for this skill because of their 
primary missions and the fact that they are designed to 
operate primarily within the irregular environment in an 
autonomous manner. USSF are more mature and trained to a 
higher standard than their conventional counterparts. They 
were selected to become USSF based on their ability to 
operate within ambiguous situations. USSF already receives 
training in language and ethnography, while learning how to 
weave together the importance of the military, political, 
economic, and domestic issues within an operational 
environment—all key skills for a successful interrogator. 
These details increase the potential for USSF to conduct 
effective interrogations to better understand what 
information will assist at the tactical level and, more 
importantly, what intelligence information needs to be 
pushed to higher level decision makers.   
B. TRAINING 
Training USSF for interrogation operations must begin 
with the basics. These include noncoercive methods and the 
ethical foundation to properly apply them. Noncoercive 
methods are consistent with the legal and moral traditions 
of the United States and, unlike coercive techniques and 
torture, are proven methods of gaining timely, accurate, and 
actionable intelligence. It will be key to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of noncoercive techniques and the numerous 
options available that are vastly opposite of what the USSF 
personnel “learned” in SERE.  Focus must be placed on 
training for interrogations conducted to gather military 
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intelligence. Interrogations designed to this end vary 
significantly from law enforcement interrogations. Current 
efforts are underway through the interagency Highvalue 
Interrogation Group (HIG) to review and update interrogation 
concepts and skills using modern scientific research 
methods. USSF should support this research and offer to 
“field test” the processes the HIG recommends. 
1. Training Internal to SF 
Interrogation training for USSF should begin during the 
Special Forces Qualification Course. Based on the amount of 
time USSF soldiers spend interacting with detainees in the 
real world during the conduct of the current conflicts, the 
procedures of handling detainees and the benefits they can 
produce should be incorporated in this training course. This 
training could easily be emphasized and utilized during the 
course’s unconventional warfare culmination exercise, “Robin 
Sage,” adding to the realism and highlighting the benefits 
of gathering HUMINT through tactical interrogation. 
Once USSF personnel are assigned to their specific unit 
within those who demonstrate a high propensity to conduct 
effective tactical interrogations should be selected for 
additional training. This training would not only allow 
these individuals to be more effective at gathering 
information through interrogation, but would provide them 
the knowledge and skill to monitor and mentor other members 
of their unit to ensure maximum efficiency of procedure and 
deter against the possibility of improper interrogation 
techniques being utilized. Based on discussions with former 
interrogation instructors, the level of interrogation 
training and instruction needed for an ODA to conduct 
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interrogation operations effectively could be accomplished 
in as little as five days with two weeks being 
optimal.110,111 To ensure all personnel remained cognizant of 
the most current and correct methods, periodic 
recertification would be required to remain “certified” to 
conduct or assist with interrogation operations. 
Implementing interrogation training into current 
training could be easily accomplished. The addition of a 
detainee/interrogation scenario into a pre-deployment 
training plan or a rotation through one of the Combat 
Training Centers would take minimal resources. Inclusion of 
this scenario would increase the realism of the training, 
increase the opportunity to enhance its skills at acquiring 
force protection information and assets, and would stress to 
the trainees the importance of learning both intelligence 
and information. 
2. Training Outside of SF 
Training on any subject without the inclusion of 
expertise will only bring an organization to a certain level 
of proficiency. To move beyond that point, experts must be 
accessed. The use of “internships” allowing individual USSF 
personnel who demonstrated an above average propensity for 
conducting interrogation to rotate into organizations 
consisting of professional interrogators would accomplish 
this goal.   
                     
110 Randy Burkett (National Intelligence Chair, Central Intelligence 
Agency Representative, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with 
the author, March 2011. 
111 Steve Kleinman (Senior Advisor and Strategist, The Soufan Group), 
in discussion with the author, March 2011. 
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Attaching USSF soldiers to a U.S. military 
interrogation unit or a civilian organization such as the 
HIG for a short amount of time would prove beneficial. USSF 
would gain invaluable “on the job training” assisting in 
actual interrogations. Learning from professional 
interrogators would allow USSF to perfect their planning 
processes and approach techniques increasing their 
proficiency and ability to gather intelligence when they 
returned to their unit to conduct FID or UW missions. 
Additional assistance would only help the already overworked 
interrogation organizations at the operational and strategic 
levels allowing them to expend resources in a more targeted 
manner. The USSF personnel would not only complete these 
“internship” assignments as better interrogators, but they 
would possess an increased understanding for the specific 
pieces of intelligence desired by higher level decision 
makers. 
C. THE ROAD AHEAD 
To conclude, the need for HUMINT by the U.S. government 
in the current irregular conflicts only increases. The 
current doctrine, designed and implemented in response to 
the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and solidified 
as law by issuance of an executive order, is having the 
unintended consequence of inhibiting the U.S. Army Special 
Forces’ ability to exploit an enormous pool of potential 
intelligence by restricting the use of interrogation to a 
mere handful of certified soldiers. This restriction is 
hampering units that operate at great distances from their 
higher headquarters and increases the risk to U.S. forces. 
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Information superiority is the key to victory in 
irregular warfare and interrogation is needed to gain this 
edge. USSF must be trained on the art and science of 
interrogation and doctrine and policy must be changed to 
grant the authorities for USSF to conduct interrogation 
operations on battlefields around the globe. The continued 
denial of the ability and authority to exploit a prime 
source of intelligence to units operating where the war is 
being fought is a shortcoming that is degrading operational 
capabilities. Failure to address this issue is degrading the 
U.S. military’s ability to efficiently and effectively 
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APPENDIX D. “SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE INTERPRETERS 
BASED ON WORK IN THE FIELD” BY SHERWOOD MORAN  
This document is no longer restricted.  The version included 
below was retyped in July 2003 from the author’s original 
document created by the Marine Corps Interrogator Translator 
Teams Association and was only marked as “RESTRICTED” to add 
to the authenticity of the reproduction.  
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